讲座题目：Do Local Governments Site Nuisance Activities Along Borders? An Empirical Strategy Applied to Wind Turbines

主讲人：Justin M. Ross（美国印第安纳大学公共与环境事务学院）

讲座时间：2018年5月31日（周四）上午10: 00-12：00

讲座地点：中央财经大学学院南路校区主教211

ABSTRACT: The ability of communities to realize Pareto efficient outcomes may potentially be realized through the practice of fiscal zoning. A common concern to this theory is the prospect that political boundaries may undermine this process. If nuisance entities produce negative externalities that decay over distance and the host fee compensation is completely internalized, then host fee compensation need not reflect the full external damages if the nuisance is sited along a political border. Furthermore, if a nuisance entity can credibly commit to being sited on either side of the border, host fee compensation can fall to zero. This paper presents a simple theoretical model that describes an empirical strategy for testing the political boundary hypothesis among local governments in an important environmental context. The strategy is applied to wind turbines in the continental United States across 1,230 local governments. The results are not supportive of the concerns and actually indicate that land near political boundaries is less likely to be used for nuisance siting.

主讲人简介：Justin M. Ross, 西弗吉尼亚大学博士，美国印第安纳大学公共与环境事务学院副教授，地方政府治理协会主席。近年来，他的论文在National Tax Journal， Public Administration Review，Public Finance Review，Public Budgeting & Finance 等国际顶级期刊发表30余篇，参加了World Bank, State Tax Notes, Government Finance Review等国际会议研讨会。他还是 National Tax Association, Association for Budgeting & Financial Management, American Economics Association, Public Choice Society 与 Southern Economic Association的会员。